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How sentences from a discourse are recognized or verified can be explained by combining 
theories of item recognition derived from list-learning experiments with hypotheses about 
the representation of text in memory within the framework of the construction-integration 
model of discourse comprehension. The implications of such a theory of sentence recogni-
tion are worked out for two experimental situations. In the first experiment, subjects read 
brief texts and were then tested for recognition with verbatim old sentences, paraphrases, 
inferences, and contextually related and unrelated new distractor sentences after delays 
from 0 to 4 days. Differential decay rates for the wording and meaning of the text and for 
situational information were observed. The theory provides a good quantitative account of 
the data. In the second experiment, the speed-accuracy trade-off in sentence verification for 
two subject groups with different prior knowledge was studied for old verbatim sentences 
and inferences. Qualitative predictions derived from the theory with the parameter estimates 
from the first study were in agreement with the data. Readers without an adequate situa-
tional understanding (novices) were found to make quick judgments based on surface and 
textbase characteristics of the test sentences, while experts in addition utilized their situa-
tion model successfully, which required more processing time. © 1990 Academic Press, inc. 
A large number of experiments on recog-
nition memory exist for lists of words or 
pictures. Several models of recognition 
memory are available today which account 
very well for most of the phenomena ob-
served in these experiments. Can these 
theories also account for experimental data 
when the materials used are not lists of 
items, but coherent discourse? By combin-
ing the essential features of current models 
of recognition memory developed for list-
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learning studies with a model of discourse 
comprehension and assumptions about the 
representation of discourse in memory, a 
model of sentence recognition and sentence 
verification can be obtained that accounts 
for major features of sentence-recognition 
data. Thus, we do not propose developing a 
new model for sentence memory. Instead, 
we shall combine existing models of list-
learning and text-comprehension processes 
to derive a theoretical analysis of sentence 
recognition and verification. 
We begin by comparing three current 
models of item recognition (Gillund & Shif-
frin, 1984; Hintzman, 1988; Murdock, 1982) 
and determine their common essential fea-
tures, to be used for modelling sentence 
memory. We will then review some notions 
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about the representation of discourse in 
memory from van Dijk & Kintsch (1983) 
and briefly sketch the construction-
integration model of discourse comprehen-
sion (Kintsch, 1988). Finally, we will show 
how these theoretical assumptions in com-
bination provide an account of sentence 
recognition and verification data. We dem-
onstrate that our model can be made to 
match a set of sentence-recognition data in 
which old verbatim sentences, para-
phrases, inferences, and new sentences are 
used as test items for retention intervals 
varying between an immediate test and a 
four-day delay (Experiment 1). The model 
is further evaluated by testing qualitative 
implications for subject groups with differ-
ent prior knowledge with respect to the 
speed-accuracy trade-off in sentence-
verification judgments (Experiment 2). 
M O D E L S OF I T E M RECOGNITION 
Three models of recognition memory will 
be considered here, those of Hintzman 
(1988), Murdock (1982), and Gillund and 
Shiffrin (1984). Al l three models are formu-
lated rigorously so that quantitative predic-
tions are possible, and all appear to be em-
pirically adequate in the domains to which 
they have been applied. 
At first glance, the three models appear 
to be about as different as they could be in 
their basic makeup: Murdock's is a distrib-
uted memory model; Hintzman postulates 
multiple episodic traces; Gillund and Shif-
frin conceive of memory as a network of 
interassociated nodes, while the other two 
models employ feature vectors. However, 
these models share some essential similari-
ties when they are expressed formally, and 
it is these that we shall use as a basis for a 
model of sentence memory. 
Hintzman (1988). This model is a multi-
trace model, in which each experience 
leaves its own memory trace. Memory 
traces, as well as test items, are repre-
sented as feature vectors, the values of the 
features being 1, - 1, or 0. The similarity of 
a memory trace to some probe is the 
(weighted) dot product of their correspond-
ing feature vectors. The total activation of a 
probe, its Intensity I, is given by the sum of 
the similarity values of the probe with all 
traces in memory. E(I) = 0 if the probe 
does not resemble any traces and increases 
as the quality of the match improves. For 
recognition judgments, the intensity I is fed 
into a decision mechanism. 
Murdock (1982). Murdock also repre-
sents memory traces as well as test items as 
feature vectors. However, a single vector 
now represents the memory trace of a 
whole list of items with which the feature 
vectors of the test items are compared on a 
recognition test. Once again, corresponding 
features of the memory vector and the test 
vector are multiplied and the resulting val-
ues are summed to obtain a retrieval 
strength value, which is then used as input 
into a decision system. There are other ver-
sions of distributed memory models for 
item recognition which differ from Mur-
dock in their mathematical formulation, but 
these differences are irrelevant at this gen-
eral level of analysis. 
Gillund and Shiffrin (1984). Unlike the 
previous two models, items in this model 
are represented as nodes related to each 
other by associate links in a retrieval struc-
ture. Suppose that there is a set of items [I], 
a test node T, and a context node C, with 
the similarity between a test node and an 
item I being S(T,I), and the similarity be-
tween the context node and item I being 
S(C,I). For recognition, the memory probe 
is assumed to consist of T and C, and the 
activation resulting from comparing the 
memory probe with item I is given by the 
product S(T,I)*S(C,I). The total activation 
of T is just the sum of the activations for 
each of the items in memory, and, as in the 
previous models, serves as a test statistic 
for a decision system. 
Obviously, this brief description does not 
do justice to the three models considered 
here. Nevertheless, it suffices to make a 
few important points. The discrepancy in 
their verbal formulation notwithstanding, 
they agree on three crucial mathematical 
properties. First, in all models the target is 
compared to all memory traces, and the 
sum of the comparison values provides the 
relevant test statistic. This sets these mod-
els apart from the previous generation of 
recognition models, where a recognition 
decision was thought to be dependent only 
upon the similarity of the target item to its 
corresponding memory trace. This is a cru-
cial feature of item recognition. However, 
it does not appear to matter much exactly 
how this comparison between the set of 
memory traces and the target item is per-
formed: whether the traces are summed 
first, and then the comparison is made (as in 
Murdock), or whether the comparisons are 
made first and their outcomes are then 
summed (as in Hintzman and Gillund & 
Shiffrin) makes no difference for present 
purposes. 
Similarity between trace and target in the 
Hintzman and Murdock models is com-
puted by the dot product of the correspond-
ing feature vectors. In Gillund and Shiffrin, 
the links in the associative network repre-
sent familiarity values directly. The dis-
course comprehension theory as formu-
lated in Kintsch (1988) lends itself more 
naturally to the latter approach, though a 
more molecular analysis would be possible 
in principle. 
Finally, all three models use a decision 
mechanism to turn strength measures (In-
tensity, Familiarity, Similarity) into Yes-
No decisions. 
These three mathematical properties suf-
ficiently specify the recognition mechanism 
for the model to be proposed here. The 
ideosyncratic features of the three models 
will be neglected in favor of these formal 
communalities. The fact that all three mod-
els fit recognition data about equally well 
implies that the features common to these 
models are responsible for the fit to the 
data. The other differences among the mod-
els represent either differences in theoreti-
cal metaphors and verbal interpretations of 
the common formal substance of the model, 
or require for their resolution a broader 
framework than just laboratory studies of 
item recognition.1 
L E V E L S OF REPRESENTATION 
In experiments using simple stimulus ma-
terials it is common practice to represent 
the outcome of a match between a memory 
trace and a test probe by a single, unitary 
value. For sentence materials or discourse, 
on the other hand, this is no longer suffi-
cient, and different types of information, 
which may play different roles in retrieval 
and decision making, must be distinguished 
(e.g., Ratcliff & McKoon, 1989). According 
to van Dijk & Kintsch (1983), three levels 
must be distinguished in the memory repre-
sentation of discourse. At one level, a text 
is characterized by the exact words and 
phrases used. This is the surface level of 
representation. Syntactic theory provides 
the tools for the description and analysis of 
this level of representation. At another 
level, not the exact wording but the seman-
tic content of the text must be represented. 
Both the local (microstructure) and global 
(macrostructure) characteristics of the text 
play a role here (Kintsch & van Dijk, 1978). 
Several representational schemes have 
been developed within linguistics, seman-
tics, artificial intelligence, and psychology 
for this purpose. We shall use here the 
propositional representation first intro-
duced in Kintsch (1974). The situation 
model is the third level of representation 
important for text comprehension (van Dijk 
& Kintsch, 1983). What is represented at 
this level is not the text itself, but the situ-
ation described by the text, detached from 
the text structure proper and embedded in 
pre-established fields of knowledge. The 
principle of organization at this level may 
not be the text's macrostructure, but the 
1 The authors of the models discussed here are con-
cerned with general models of human memory. The 
formal similarity noted above does not hold outside 
the domain of item recognition. 
knowledge schema (e.g., an appropriate 
script or frame) used to assimilate it. 
In a number of experimental studies it 
has been shown that these three levels of 
representation can be distinguished in sen-
tence recognition experiments (e.g., 
Fletcher & Chrysler, in press; Schmalhofer 
& Glavanov, 1986). Old verbatim sentences 
are represented at all three levels of repre-
sentation: the surface structure, the text-
base, and the situation model. Paraphrases 
of old sentences, on the other hand, differ 
in terms of the surface structure from what 
is stored in memory, but not at the textbase 
and situation model level. Inference state-
ments that were not directly expressed in 
the text differ from the memory represen-
tation both in terms of their surface struc-
ture and propositional content, but they are 
part of the same situation model. Finally, 
contextually related, but not inferable test 
sentences differ from the memory represen-
tation at all three levels. Thus, by looking at 
the differences among these types of test 
sentences, estimates of the memory 
strength at each level of representation may 
be obtained in sentence recognition exper-
iments. 
T H E CONSTRUCTION-INTEGRATION 
M O D E L 
The construction-integration model of 
Kintsch (1988) describes how texts are rep-
resented in memory in the process of un-
derstanding and how they are integrated 
into the comprehended s knowledge base. 
The crucial features of the model are as 
follows. Comprehension is simulated as a 
production system, the rules of which op-
erate at various levels: some build proposi-
tions from the linguistic information pro-
vided by the text; some generate macro-
propositions; some retrieve knowledge 
from the comprehended s long-term mem-
ory that is related to the text, thus serving 
as mechanisms for elaboration and infer-
ence. Al l these rules share one general 
characteristic: they are weak, "dumb" 
rules that do not always achieve the desired 
results. In addition to what should have 
been constructed, these rules generate re-
dundant, useless, and even contradictory 
material. In contrast, most other models of 
comprehension attempt to specify strong, 
"smart" rules, which, guided by schemata, 
arrive at just the right interpretations, acti-
vate just the right knowledge, and generate 
just the right inferences. 
Smart rules necessarily must be quite 
complex, and it is very hard to make smart 
rules work right in ever-changing contexts. 
Weak rules, as they are used here, are ob-
viously much more robust—but, left to 
themselves, they do not generate accept-
able representations of the text. Irrelevant 
or contradictory items that have been gen-
erated by weak rules, however, can be 
eliminated, if we consider not just the items 
generated by the rules, but also the pattern 
of interrelationships among them. Gener-
ated items which are irrelevant to the text 
as a whole will be related only to one or a 
few other items. Contradictory items will 
be negatively connected to some of the 
other items in the network of items. Rele-
vant items, on the other hand, will tend to 
be strongly interrelated—be it because they 
are derived from the same phrase in the 
text, or because they are close together in 
the textbase, or because they are related 
semantically or experientially in the com-
prehender's knowledge base. Thus, if acti-
vation is allowed to settle in the network, 
an integrated representation of the relevant 
items is obtained. 
A simple example will illustrate these 
processes. Suppose we are concerned with 
the meaning of "bank" in " A large amount 
of money was lost when the bank was 
robbed by a masked gunman." A smart rule 
would assign "bank" the proper meaning 
on the basis of contextual information—we 
know money is more likely to be lost when 
a financial institution is robbed than a river 
bank. A dumb rule constructs interpreta-
tions for both of the meanings of "bank" 
that are known, "bank-1 was robbed" as 
well as "bank-2 was robbed." However, 
we construct not just isolated propositions, 
but interrelate them in a network. This is 
possible because the propositions of a text 
are related in various ways—syntactically, 
semantically, via the discourse structure, 
and through general world knowledge. In 
consequence, a network of interrelated 
propositions can be obtained, in which 
"bank-1" is strongly connected with the 
rest of the text, the "money," the "masked 
gunman," etc., while the bank-2 proposi-
tions would not be connected with the rest 
of the network. Activation in this network 
will collect in those parts of the network 
that are tightly interrelated, and the isolated 
"bank-2" propositions will become deacti-
vated. Thus, the network rejects the inap-
propriate interpretation that had been con-
structed. The construction-integration 
model in this way achieves with weak, ro-
bust construction rules followed by a 
spreading activation stage (integration) the 
same result that smart but complex rules 
would have achieved. 
Kintsch (1988) not only describes the rel-
evant details of this model, but also reports 
some results that (a) suggest that this kind 
of a model may capture some features of 
human comprehension processes better 
than "smart" comprehension models, and 
(b) demonstrate that the model is computa-
tionally adequate in some reasonably com-
plex domains. 
The construction-integration model pro-
vides a natural account of sentence recog-
nition. First, comprehension of a paragraph 
is simulated in the way just outlined, result-
ing in a memory representation consisting 
of text propositions, plus whatever knowl-
edge elaborations and inferences survived 
the integration process. These items have 
some sort of activation value—central, im-
portant propositions being more highly ac-
tivated than peripheral ones—and they are 
related to each other in the ways specified 
by the model. Formally, this means we 
have an activation vector A, specifying for 
each constructed element a final activation 
value, and a coherence matrix C, specifying 
the relations among these elements. To-
gether A and C characterize in the model 
the memory representation achieved as a 
result of comprehending this paragraph. 
The model is then given the to-
be-recognized test sentence to compre-
hend, for which it will construct the same 
kind of representation. In recognition, the 
representation of the test sentence is com-
pared with the representation of the whole 
paragraph: we determine how much of the 
total activation flows into that part of the 
network that represents the test sentence. 
In the case of an old sentence, all parts of it 
are already part of the network and we 
merely have to add up the total activation of 
all its constituents. In the case of a new 
sentence, new elements have to be ap-
pended to the network. These are con-
nected to the network in exactly the same 
way as the network was established origi-
nally. In the case of an inference or para-
phrase, typically some of the elements cor-
respond to already existing nodes in the 
network, while others have to be appended 
to the network. If a test sentence fits in well 
with the original text (e.g., it is actually a 
part of it), it will become strongly activated. 
If it has no connections at all to the original 
material, it will not be activated at all. The 
more similar it is to the original, the more 
connections there will be, and the more 
highly activated the test sentence will be-
come. Thus, we can use the amount of ac-
tivation that flows from the original para-
graph to the test sentence as a measure of 
its familiarity or strength, and use a deci-
sion rule to derive a binary recognition re-
sponse. 
Consequently, the proposed model of 
sentence recognition is based on three com-
ponents: a recognition mechanism from the 
list-learning literature, the notion that dis-
course is represented at different levels, 
and the processing mechanisms of the con-
struction-integration model. The test 
item—the test sentence—is compared, at 
each level of representation, against all 
items in memory—the whole text. The 
comparison yields an index of the similarity 
between what is remembered and the test 
item, as measured by the amount of activa-
tion that flows from the memory represen-
tation into the test item. This similarity in-
dex is then used in a decision mechanism. 
Thus, the recognition principles derived 
from the list learning literature have been 
embedded into the framework of the con-
struction-integration model. 
In the next section, an experiment on 
sentence recognition from discourse will be 
described. These data will provide the set-
ting for the detailed and formal develop-
ment of our model. 
S E N T E N C E RECOGNITION 
Experiment 1 
Zimny (1987) studied sentence recogni-
tion for verbatim old sentences, para-
phrases, inferences, and two types of dis-
tractor sentences for retention intervals up 
to four days. She constructed 18 texts of 
about 150 to 200 words each, based on the 
scriptal norms of Galambos (1982). Each 
text described a sequence of scriptal events 
(e.g., "Nick goes to the movies") by string-
ing together high-frequency, familiar ac-
tions from the norms, interspersed with 
some nonscriptal material (e.g., his girl-
friend wore a dress with pink polka dots). 
The reason for constructing these texts ac-
cording to script norms was so that we 
knew what sort of situation model was 
likely to be constructed for each text, 
namely a script-based one. Linguistic anal-
yses specify the structure of the surface 
representation for arbitrary texts, and prop-
ositional analyses are similarly general, 
yielding textbase hierarchies for a wide va-
riety of texts. Unfortunately, this is not the 
case for the situation model: for most texts 
we have no clear idea what sort of a situa-
tion model would be generated. Conse-
quently, we must work with special cases 
where enough research has been done to 
establish this kind of information. Research 
in this area has therefore focused on a few 
cases such as maps, as in Perrig and Kintsch 
(1985); mental models, as in Johnson-Laird 
(1983); or scripts, as in Bower, Black, and 
Turner (1979) as well as the present case. 
For each text, Zimny constructed five 
test sentences which vary in terms of their 
level of discourse representation. Old sen-
tences appeared at test as they had in the 
original text, and are represented at the sur-
face, textbase, and situation model levels. 
Paraphrases involved minimal word order 
or single word changes; they are identical 
with sentences from the text at the levels of 
their textbase and situation model, but dif-
fer in some ways in their surface structure. 
Inferences were sentences that could be in-
ferred by readers from the surrounding con-
text with high reliability; these sentences fit 
into the same situation model as actual sen-
tences from the text, but they differed both 
in terms of their textbase and surface rep-
resentations. While an attempt was made to 
keep the test sentences similar in terms of 
their length and complexity, they obviously 
had to differ in numerous ways, with some 
being much more salient and recognizable 
than others. Therefore, Zimny wrote three 
different versions of her texts, so that each 
sentence could serve either as an old, para-
phrase, or inference sentence. In addition, 
two entirely new test sentences were used 
with each text. One sentence was contex-
tually appropriate, while the other was un-
related to the theme and context of the text 
and served as the baseline for the recogni-
tion analysis. 
One group of subjects was asked to rec-
ognize the test sentences for each text right 
after reading the text. Subjects were in-
structed to answer "Yes" if they thought 
they had seen the sentence before, and 
" N o " otherwise. Three other groups of 
subjects received the test sentences after 
delays of 40 min, 2 days, or 4 days. 
The results most relevant for present pur-
poses are shown in Figs. 1 and 2. Figure 1 
shows the percent "Yes" responses sub-
jects gave to old test sentences, para-
phrases, inferences, as well as context ap-
propriate and context inappropriate distrac-
tor items as a function of delay. The old 
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FIG. 1. Probability of Yes responses for old sentences, paraphrases, inferences, and context ap-
propriate and inappropriate new sentences as a function of delay; after Zimny (1987). 
sentences, paraphrases, and inferences as 
well as the main effect of delay were both 
significant statistically, but most impor-
tantly, there was a significant interaction 
between these factors, F(6,280) = 38.7, p 
< .001. Figure 2 provides estimates of the 
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F I G . 2. Estimated strengths of the surface, 
textbase, and model traces; after Zimny (1987). 
sentation over the delay intervals. The per-
cent "Yes" data were first turned into d! 
measures by using the context inappropri-
ate distractor items as a baseline. This 
transformation was necessary to remove 
strong, delay-dependent bias effects from 
the analysis: on the immediate test, sub-
jects used a strict criterion for saying they 
had seen a sentence before, but after four 
days they were willing to assert this on the 
basis of much weaker evidence. (Note the 
increase in Yes responses as a function of 
delay in Fig. 1). Secondly, difference mea-
sures between the d's were computed. The 
difference between the memory strengths 
of old sentences and paraphrases provides 
a measure of the strength of the surface rep-
resentation (how something was said). The 
difference between the strengths of the 
paraphrase sentences and inferences pro-
vides a measure of the strength of the text-
base representation (whether something 
was actually said in the text or not). And 
finally, the difference between the strength 
of the contextually appropriate distractor 
items and the inference sentences provides 
a measure of the strength of the situation 
model (whether something is true in the 
given situational context or not). These dif-
ference values are plotted in Fig. 2. A sta-
tistical analysis of these data revealed that, 
in addition to significant main effects, the 
interaction between delay and trace type 
was also significant statistically, F(6,280) 
= 6.29, p < .001. 
Figure 2 shows some interesting trends. 
First of all, surface memory was found only 
on the immediate test. Memory for the text-
base was quite strong initially, decreased 
with delay, but remained above zero even 
after four days. Situational memory, on the 
other hand, stayed at a high level, indepen-
dent of delay.2 These are the data that will 
be modelled here. 
The Memory Representation of the Text 
To derive theoretical predictions for the 
data from the Zimny experiment, some-
what different aspects of the construction-
integration model will have to be empha-
sized than in Kintsch (1988). In Kintsch 
(1988) the memory representation of a text 
was developed only at the prepositional 
level: surface traces, as well as situational 
representations were neglected. Obviously, 
these distinctions must be made explicit in 
a treatment of sentence recognition. On the 
other hand, the focus of Kintsch (1988) was 
on the performance of the model as an in-
ference engine—something that we shall 
neglect in the present application of the 
model. The reason for omitting this aspect 
of the model is that it does little actual work 
in the present application, and that its in-
clusion would make an already complex 
2 The task-dependent nature of these results should 
be emphasized: long-term memory for surface features 
is frequently observed in other contexts, as is forget-
ting of situational information. Forgetting rates are 
clearly material- and task-dependent (for a review, see 
Kinfsch & Ericsson, in press). 
story even more complicated. This simpli-
fication does introduce some distortions, 
however, which will have to be considered 
after the simplified case has been pre-
sented. 
The Zimny data are averaged over sub-
jects and sentences. Predictions will be de-
rived for a single text which is much briefer 
than the original texts used by Zimny, and 
for only a few specific test sentences. While 
these materials are not atypical, it is cer-
tainly the case that for another text exam-
ple and other test sentences somewhat dif-
ferent quantitative predictions and parame-
ter values may have been obtained. Thus, 
predictions for a "typical" subject and ma-
terial set are compared here with data av-
eraged over subjects and materials. 
The following two-sentence text will be 
used as the input text: Nick decided to go to 
the movies. He looked at the newspaper to 
see what was playing. (This is the beginning 
of a text based on a Going-to-the-Movies 
script used by Zimny (1987), which then 
continues through the whole event.) In 
Kintsch (1988), this text would have been 
broken down into propositional units (such 
as NICK, (GO-TO,NICK,MOVIES), etc.) 
which then would activate knowledge (per-
haps Nick wanted to see a film) through 
their associative links in the reader's long-
term memory store. This propositional 
structure would be consolidated through an 
integration process which eliminates the 
context-irrelevant knowledge that had been 
activated. For the sake of simplicity, we 
omit the knowledge activation process in 
this application, and only look at the actual 
text contents, as explained above. Instead, 
the role of surface properties of the text as 
well as the situation model in sentence rec-
ognition will be modelled: we make explicit 
in our analysis the linguistic relations as 
well as the scriptal relations among the in-
put units in the text. 
A simulation of the model constructs a 
network of text elements that specifies how 
strongly each element is related to every 
other element in the network. We are con-
cerned with three types of relationships, 
corresponding to the three levels of repre-
sentation of text in memory. Within each 
level, we specify relation strengths in terms 
of distances among nodes in a coherence 
network. The pattern of interconnected-
ness among these nodes will determine the 
degree of activation each element will re-
ceive. 
In Fig. 3, 10 word groups (linguistic ele-
ments, L) have been distinguished in the 
text. Most of these correspond to proposi-
tions (P) as well as elements of the situation 
model (M), except P7 and M7 do not have a 
corresponding linguistic element L7. The 
linguistic elements form syntactic chunks 
(S) according to the phrase structure of the 
sentences [e.g., L3 (to-go-to) and L4 (the-
movies) combine to form the chunk S3]. 
Together, L and S constitute the elements 
of the surface representation of the text. 
(They are distinguished here merely for 
convenience, to allow a ready comparison 
between the actual words and phrases used 
in the text and the propositions or situation 
model elements corresponding to these 
words or phrases.) The graph shown in Fig. 
3 allows one to calculate a distance matrix 
among the L- and S-elements: for instance, 
LI is one step away from SI, three steps 
away from L2, and not connected to L10. 
The propositions PI to P9 are connected 
to each other in a somewhat different pat-
tern. Following Kintsch (1974), one can ap-
proximate the structure of a propositional 
textbase by noting the pattern of argument 
overlap among the propositions. For exam-
ple, PI appears as an argument in P2, P3, 
P5, and P8, while P2 overlaps with PI and 
P3. The textbase structure obtained via ar-
gument overlap is shown in Fig. 4. This net-
work defines a distance matrix among the 
propositional elements: P2 is a single step 
away from PI, three steps away from P7, 
and four steps away from P9. 
A similar distance matrix can be com-
puted for the elements of the situation 
model. Since the text was explicitly con-
S8 
LI 
He lookedat t henewspape r tosee what w a s p l a y i n g . 
(LOOK P 1 , P 6 ) ( N E W S P A P E R ) ( C A U S E , P 5 , P 8 ) ( S E E , P 1 . P 9 X P L A Y J N M O V I E S ) 
P 5 P6 P7 P8 P9 
M5 M6 M7 M8 M9 
FIG. 3. Surface, textbase, and situation model elements of the to-be-remembered text. 
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Props s l o t , (D) an Agent s l o t 





FIG. 4. The coherence nets formed by the textbase and the situation model. 
structed from script norms, it is assumed 
that the situation model in this case is struc-
tured as a script (i.e. as a schema with slots 
for Properties, Agents, Preparatory Steps, 
etc.) (e.g., Schank & Abelson, 1977). The 
script header M10 must be added to the 
items directly derived from the text—an ex-
ception to the policy of neglecting all infer-
ences in the present application of the 
model. The resulting structure is also 
shown in Fig. 4. This time, M2 is one step 
away from M3, two steps from M l , one 
step from M7, and three steps from M9. 
It is not necessary to think of LI (the 
exact word used in the text), PI (the corre-
sponding proposition), and M l (an element 
of the situation model) as three distinct ob-
jects in the reader's memory representa-
tion. It is the same " N i c k " in all three 
cases, but viewed once from a linguistic 
perspective where it enters into a certain 
set of relations with other linguistic ele-
ments, once considered as a proposition 
which plays a role in the textbase, and once 
considered in terms of its role in the "Go-
to-the-Movies" script. For analytic pur-
poses it is useful to distinguish L , P, and M 
units, but what matters conceptually is that 
text elements enter into different relation-
ships with other elements, depending upon 
the level of analysis: surface, propositional, 
or situational.3 
For the analyses in Figs. 3 and 4 it was 
necessary to work with a particular phrase 
structure grammar, textbases were con-
structed in a particular way, and the scripts 
were assumed to have particular forms. 
There are, of course, other phrase structure 
grammars, textbases need not be based on 
argument overlap, and different assump-
tions about the slots of a script could be 
made. However, the analyses used here are 
well-motivated and well-established, and 
most alternative analyses would in practice 
3 The reason we do not just have an element 4 41" 
instead of LI , PI, and M l , adding the three types of 
relationships together, is that on recognition tests we 
are usually dealing with only one of these elements, 
but not the others. 
be highly correlated. Nevertheless, more 
sophisticated analyses (e.g., a textbase that 
explicitly takes into account causal connec-
tions) might lead to marginally better re-
sults. 
The relationships shown in Figs. 3 and 4 
define a network which can be represented 
by a coherence matrix, which will provide 
the basis for the integration process. The 
rows and columns of this matrix are given 
by the elements LI to LI 1, SI to S8, PI to 
P9, and M l to M10. The entries of the ma-
trix designate the strength of the relation-
ship between row and column elements. At 
this point numerical parameters must be es-
timated for the strength of relations among 
the elements which are shown in the graphs 
of Figs. 3 and 4. An unsystematic trial-
and-error procedure was employed to ob-
tain these estimates. Intuition suggests that 
local relations in the surface structure and 
textbase are quite strong but weaken rap-
idly as the distance between items in-
creases. Hence, values of 5 and 3 were used 
in the coherence matrix for items 0 (the re-
lationship of a node to itself) and 1 step 
apart in either in the surface structure or in 
the or textbase. All other connections were 
set to 0. On the other hand, scripts are more 
stable long-term memory structures, allow-
ing for more long-distance relations, so that 
strength values of 4, 3, 2 and 1 were as-
signed to items 0, 1, 2 and 3 steps apart in 
the script structure, respectively. Finally, a 
value of 4 was used to tie together the same 
node at different levels of representation 
[e.g., L I to PI, and PI to M l (we assumed 
there were no direct connections between 
LI and Ml)]. In consequence, the effective 
connections for the surface and textbase el-
ements in the coherence matrix correspond 
to the links shown in Figs. 3 and 4, but the 
connections among the model elements are 
much richer, since not only neighboring 
nodes are directly connected, but also 
nodes two and three steps apart in Fig. 4. 
The parameters estimated here are 
unique up to a multiplicative constant. 
These estimates in part reflect general con-
straints, such as the farther away, the 
weaker the connection must be. Within 
these constraints, the exact numerical val-
ues obtained result from goodness of fit 
considerations. For instance, replacing 5-
3-0 for surface and textbase connections 
with 4-2-0 gives somewhat less satisfactory 
fits, but replacing it with 4-3-2-1-0, the val-
ues used for the situation model connec-
tions, destroys the fit entirely, as does a 
5-3-0 choice for the situation model. Thus, 
there seems to be a substantive interpreta-
tion for these estimates: surface and text-
base connections are strong initially, but 
very local, while the important feature of 
the situation model connections is that they 
reach beyond their immediate neighbors. 
In this way a 38 x 38 coherence matrix 
was obtained for the text under consider-
ation. Each of the 38 items was assigned an 
initial weight of 1/38 in an activation vector 
A l . This activation vector was successively 
multiplied with the coherence matrix to al-
low the activation to spread from the initial 
elements through the connections specified 
by the coherence matrix to other parts of 
the network, and finally, to settle in those 
parts of the network where the greatest in-
terconnectivity exists. After each multipli-
cation, the resulting activation vector was 
renormalized so that the sum of all activa-
tion values was 1. After 7 such cycles the 
average change in activation was less than 
.0001, and the process of spreading activa-
tion was stopped at that point. Figure 5 
shows the pattern of activation over the 38 
elements in the activation vector. L and S 
elements wind up with relatively low acti-
vation values (because only a few linguistic 
connections contribute to the spread of ac-
tivation, given the matrix structure and pa-
rameter values assumed above). P elements 
are more strongly activated, partly because 
they are embedded in a more strongly in-
terconnected network than the linguistic el-
ements, and partly because they are di-
rectly connected to the dominant M ele-
ments. The reason for the higher activation 
of the M elements is of course their much 
A c t i v a t i o n 
FIG. 5. Final activation values (multiplied by 1000) of the language units (LI to LI0), the surface 
chunks (SI to S8), propositions (PI to P9), and model elements (Ml to M10). 
greater interconnectedness. Note that the 
only inference admitted here, the "Going-
to-the-Movies" script header, has become 
one of the most highly activated items. 
The memory trace after reading the text, 
then, consists of three components: the 38 
elements that were constructed from the 
text (in the general case, these would be 
augmented by a substantial amount of acti-
vated knowledge—inferences and elabora-
tions), their interconnections as repre-
sented by the coherence matrix C, and their 
activation values, given by the activation 
vector A. 
Recognition of Test Sentences 
We can now turn to the recognition test. 
First, consider an old test sentence that is 
taken verbatim from the original text (e.g., 
He looked at the newspaper). As in the 
memory models discussed above, the famil-
iarity value of this sentence is based on the 
dot product T*A, where T is a vector with 
unit activation in all elements associated 
with the test sentence and A is the activa-
tion vector.4 The results of this calculation 
are shown in Table 1. Paraphrases, infer-
ences, and other new test sentences are 
treated in exactly the same way as old test 
sentences, except that the construction 
processes upon reading the test sentence 
now introduce elements into the network 
which were not present in the original rep-
resentation of the to-be-remembered text. 
Consider a paraphrase, such as Nick 
4 It is difficult to decide whether the sum or the 
average provides a better test statistic. Summing the 
activation values of the elements, as is done in taking 
a dot product, favors longer test sentences over 
shorter ones. It is an empirical question whether sub-
jects are more likely to respond "yes" to longer sen-
tences, if the average activation value of the elements 
is held constant. We are not aware of experimental 
evidence that could decide this issue. 
T A B L E 1 
TEST SENTENCES A N D THEIR FAMILIARITY V A L U E S 
O L D P A R A P H R A S E 
"He looked at the newspaper" "Nick studied the newspaper" 
L10 18 LI 19 
L5 17 studied 0 
L6 10 L6 10 
S4 11 s 2 
S5 24 s 4 
PI 53 PI 53 
P5 52 P5 51 
P6 22 P6 22 
M l 46 M l 45 
M5 58 M5 58 
M6 36 M6 36 
Total 347 Total 300 
INFERENCES 
"Nick wanted to see a film" "Nick bought the newspaper" 
LI 11 LI 17 
wanted 0 bought 10 
to-see 0 L6 1 
a-film 0 s 3 
S 0 s 4 
S 0 PI 52 
S 2 [BUY,P1,P6] 24 
PI 39 P6 14 
[WANT,P1,P] 8 M l 44 
[SEE,P1,P] 8 [BUY,M1,M6] 40 
[FILM] 1 M6 19 















M l 45 
Total 153 
Note. The activation values of each element of a test sentences are shown (multiplied by 1000). Old elements 
are labelled as in Fig. 3; new elements are written out or, in the case of linguistic chunks, indicated by an S. 
studied the newspaper. This time, the test 
sentence is only in part contained in the 
existing memory representation of the orig-
inal text, so that we have to add several 
new elements to the coherence matrix in 
order to represent both the existing mem-
ory trace and the given test sentence. An 
inspection of Fig. 3 shows that there are 
three elements to be added: the word stud-
ied (but not the proposition P5, which re-
mains unaffected by the substitution of a 
synonym), as well as two new S elements 
(in place of S4 and S5). These three new 
elements are added to the coherence matrix 
and connected with the existing memory 
structure in the same way as the original 
elements themselves were interconnected 
(so that "studied" is two steps away from 
L6, "the newspaper", but three, via the 
two new S-units, from L10, "he", etc.). 
Thus, an expanded coherence matrix C p is 
obtained. Activation is now spread through 
this new structure until the activation vec-
tor A p stabilizes, which occurs after just 2 
cycles. Table 1 shows the resulting pattern 
of activation for this test sentence. Its fa-
miliarity is slightly below that of the old, 
verbatim sentence, in qualitative agreement 
with Zimny's data. 
The computation of familiarity values is 
shown for two inference sentences in Table 
1. The first test sentence, "Nick wanted to 
see a film" is composed almost entirely of 
new elements, requiring the addition of 12 
items to the original coherence matrix. It is 
a plausible inference (though not a logically 
necessary one), and its familiarity value 
comes out quite high, though well below 
that of the paraphrase sentence. The sec-
ond inference sentence "Nick bought the 
newspaper" shares more elements with the 
original memory structure, but does not fit 
into the script structure as tightly as the 
first (wanting to see a film is itself a prepa-
ratory step in the Movies script, while buy-
ing the newspaper is just something ap-
pended to the newspaper introduced ear-
lier). As a result, the second inference 
receives slightly less activation than the 
first. Finally, the familiarity value of a dis-
tractor sentence "Nick went swimming" is 
computed in Table 1; its only connection 
with the original paragraph is the name 
"Nick ," and it receives the lowest activa-
tion value, as it should. 
With additional assumptions about for-
getting, further predictions can be derived. 
Suppose we simulate memory for two delay 
intervals, a short delay, corresponding to 
Zimny's 40-min interval, and a long delay, 
corresponding to the 4-day delay. We want 
to derive predictions for the time of recog-
nition testing (i.e., after the paragraph has 
been read and after forgetting has taken 
place). We are assuming that the effect of 
forgetting is a weakening of the connections 
between the items in memory, with the con-
nections among surface traces decaying 
most rapidly, textbase connections less so, 
while the situation model remains intact, as 
in the Zimny study (Fig. 2). Numerically, 
this means that we set surface and textbase 
connections to 4 and 2 for 0- and 1-step 
distances (instead 5 and 3) to simulate the 
short-delay test. For the long-delay test, all 
surface connections are set to 0, and text-
base connections to 3 and 1, for 0- and 1-
step distances, respectively. (Note that we 
are in effect collapsing acquisition and re-
tention into a single matrix here.) Then, the 
same calculations are performed as in Table 
1. However, the resulting activation values 
are not directly comparable across the 
three delay intervals, because of the way 
activation vectors have been renormalized 
after each multiplication. By keeping the 
total activation always at 1, the activation 
vectors indicate only relative values among 
the items in each vector, but not absolute 
values across different matrices. Such a 
model would incorrectly imply that the 
overall response strength does not decrease 
with delay, although the individual connec-
tion strengths are assumed to decrease. In 
order to avoid this consequence of the nor-
malization procedure, each activation vec-
tor must be weighted by the total sum of all 
entries in the corresponding coherence ma-
trix (alternatively, we could have incorpo-
rated this weighting in the normalization 
procedure). If there are many and numeri-
cally stronger connections in a matrix (im-
mediately after reading), activation will 
reach a higher level than if there are fewer 
and weaker connections (after 4 days). 
These absolute strength values for the three 
delay intervals are shown for old sentences, 
paraphrases, inferences, and new sen-
tences in Fig. 6. 
We want to compare Fig. 6 with the data 
shown in Figs. 1 and 2 to assess the good-
ness of fit of the model for sentence recog-
nition proposed here. It is not a straight 
comparison, however, for the data are 
based upon averages over many subjects 
and a substantial number of texts and test 
sentences. Figure 6 is based upon the few 
examples shown in Table 1. Would another 
set of sample sentences yield identical, or 
even similar results? Yes, in the sense that 
we can find many sentences of each type 
that would be essentially interchangeable 
with the ones we have chosen; no, in the 
sense that we could find many sentences 
that would not. 
That is not necessarily a weakness of our 
approach—it is more a reflection of the re-
ality of sentence recognition. One old sen-
tence is not necessarily like another one, 
and paraphrases and inferences are even 
less so. Given a text, one can define a set of 
"old" sentences or phrases (e.g., for the 
text in Fig. 3, there is the first sentence. Old 
1; the first phrase of the second sentence-
,which we have actually used as our exam-
ple and which we shall call Old 2; and the 
second phrase of that sentence, Old 3). One 
can compute the activation values (summed 
over delay) for all three of these test sen-
tences (or phrases), and find an average 
value. The variation among these sentences 
is substantial, however: Old 1 ("Nick de-
cided to go to the movies") has an activa-
tion value which is 124% of the average; 
Old 3 ("to see a what was playing") is only 
72% of the average; and only our choice, 
Old 2 ("He looked at the newspaper") is 
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FIG. 6. Absolute activation values for the old test sentence, paraphrase, inference, and new test 
sentence as a function of delay. 
closer to the paraphrase in Fig. 6 than to 
Old 2. Intuitively, that is not at all surpris-
ing: Old 1 seems just so much more mem-
orable than Old 3. And it is surely no rarity 
empirically to find that a subtle paraphrase 
of a salient sentence is recognized better 
than many old sentences. 
The situation is even more complex for 
inferences. We have used two inferences in 
Table 1 which differ considerably in their 
activation values. Indeed, "Nick wanted to 
see a film" is slightly closer in activation to 
the paraphrase in Table 1 than to the other 
inference, "Nick bought the newspaper", 
and it takes little imagination to come up 
with inferences even more discrepant. Con-
sider "Nick wore pants", which we can in-
fer from our little story probably with 
greater certainty than "Nick bought the 
newspaper". In our model, it would receive 
an activation value identical to "Nick went 
swimming", our false test sentence. But 
that is just as it should be, because that is 
what we would expect to find empirically! 
We talk about (pragmatic) "inferences" as 
if they constituted a class of sentences with 
respect to a given text that has certain well-
defined common properties. That is just not 
the case. There are all kinds of inferences, 
and they will behave very differently in ex-
periments, as well as in our model. The ex-
perimenter carefully constructed her stim-
ulus materials by selecting typical, well-
behaved sentences, and avoiding unusual 
ones as best she could. The theoretician 
must similarly perform his analyses on ma-
terials that are reasonably prototypical. 
There is no pool of "inference sentences" 
(or, for that matter, paraphrases or distrac-
tors) from which items could be sampled 
randomly, and to which, therefore, the re-
sults could be generalized. The domain of 
generalization is an informal one: texts and 
sentences that are like the ones used here. 
One could, in principle, derive predictions 
for all the materials used in an experiment. 
However, the labor involved would be pro-
hibitive and not much would be gained, be-
cause we would still want to generalize our 
results not just to the sentences actually 
used in the experiment, but to all sentences 
like those used—an ill-defined domain. Our 
primary concern is not to predict what will 
happen with a set of particular texts and 
sentence materials, but with exploring 
whether the processes postulated by the 
theory can provide a good account of sen-
tence recognition. 
Obviously, Fig. 6 gives a fair qualitative 
account of the data in Figs. 1 and 2. The 
differences in response strengths between 
old items and paraphrases disappear as de-
lay increases, and old items, inferences, 
and new items converge, but not com-
pletely. In order to go from the strength 
values shown in Fig. 6 to Yes-No re-
sponses, further assumptions need to be 
made about how strength values are trans-
formed into Yes-No decisions. A simple re-
sponse-strength model was assumed em-
ploying a ratio rule. The probability of a 
Yes response was computed by subtracting 
from each strength value a delay-specific 
threshold value and dividing the result by 
the total response strength, mapping the 
strength values into the [0,1] interval. Thus, 
four parameters need to be estimated for 
this purpose: a threshold for a Yes response 
for each of three delay intervals, and a 
value for the total response strength. The 
reason for introducing delay-specific 
thresholds at this point lies in the bias ef-
fects observed over the four-day delay in 
the Yes responses in Zimny's experiment 
(Fig. 1): we removed these biases by focus-
ing on df statistics and activation strengths, 
but now that we want to account for Yes 
responses, these bias effects have to be re-
introduced. The fourth parameter, on the 
other hand, is simply a scaling factor 
needed to map strength values into proba-
bilities. These four parameters were esti-
mated by the method of least squares. The 
resulting fit to the data from Fig. 1 is shown 
in Fig. 7. 
It would be hard to improve the fit of the 
100 
Immed. Short-Del Long-Del 
D e l a y 
FIG. 7. Observed ( ) and predicted ( ) percent yes responses as a function of sentence type 
and delay. 
predictions in Fig. 7 through more sophis-
ticated methods of parameter estimation for 
the coherence matrices, or a more elabo-
rate decision model. Clearly, the present 
model does very well, in that it gives a good 
qualitative account of the data (Table 1; 
Fig. 6), as well as a good quantitative fit 
(Fig. 7). 
In evaluating the fit of the model it must 
be remembered that we have not con-
structed an ad hoc model for sentence rec-
ognition, but have put together this model 
from various existing components: a recog-
nition mechanism from the list-learning lit-
erature, ideas about the memory represen-
tation, and a model of comprehension pro-
cesses from recent work on discourse 
processing. Neither is there anything new 
about the way memory representations are 
constructed here: phrase structure chunks, 
textbases, and scripts are all familiar and 
widely used. Even the parameters in the 
model are constrained, both a priori (con-
nection strengths can decrease with delay, 
but not increase), and empirically (surface 
traces must decay rapidly, textbase traces 
more slowly and incompletely, and model 
traces not at all). A theory of sentence rec-
ognition has been constructed largely from 
old parts, and it appears to be empirically 
adequate. 
Nevertheless, a more skeptical view is 
also possible. There are a large number of 
parameters in the theory, and although it is 
not known how many are really free to vary 
(nor how this relates to the degrees of free-
dom in the data), their precise values are 
probably underconstrained. Furthermore, 
illustrative predictions for particular test 
sentences are used as a basis for predicting 
data averaged over many texts and sen-
tences as well as subjects. In short, it is not 
entirely obvious what is responsible for the 
good fit that was obtained—the theoretical 
principles emphasized here, or the design 
decisions made in putting this theory to-
gether. 
To some extent this dilemma reflects the 
fact that it is hardly ever possible to evalu-
ate a complex theory with respect to a sin-
gle set of data. Fortunately, the theory 
makes some additional predictions that do 
not depend on any further parameter esti-
mation. If the model presented here is more 
or less correct, then other predictions about 
sentence recognition follow which can be 
evaluated at least qualitatively without fur-
ther parameter estimation. 
SPEED-ACCURACY 
T R A D E - O F F FUNCTIONS 
In deriving the predictions for the Zimny 
(1987) data shown in Figs. 6 and 7, two dif-
ferent inference statements were used as 
examples. Both were pragmatic inferences 
that people were likely to make in this con-
text, but they differed in interesting ways. 
The first inference, "Nick wanted to see a 
film" is strongly related to the text at the 
level of the situation model: it is a common 
(though not a necessary) prerequisite for 
going to the movies. On the other hand, at 
the textbase and surface levels, the connec-
tion is made only by a single term, "Nick". 
In contrast, the second inference, "Nick 
bought the newspaper", shares both 
"Nick" and "newspaper" with the original 
text at the surface and textbase levels, but 
is not directly related to the going-
to-the-movies script; it is merely an adden-
dum to "newspaper". This makes an inter-
esting difference in the way the present 
model handles these statements. 
As was shown in Table 1, the wanting-
to-see-a-film inference accrues more acti-
vation (256 units) than the buying-the-
newspaper inference (228 units). However, 
there is a significant difference in the speed 
with which this accrual occurs. In the first 
case, the amount of activation attracted by 
the inference statement in the first cycle is 
low (173 units, or 68% of the eventual to-
tal), and rises rather slowly over 13 cycles 
to its asymptotic value. The second infer-
ence, on the other hand, gets most of its 
activation right away (198 units, or 87%, so 
it is initially the stronger one) and reaches 
asymptote in 9 cycles. These examples sug-
gest that model-based inferences are weak 
initially but increase in strength to a high 
value with enough processing, while infer-
ences that are based more on surface simi-
larity acquire activation quickly, but do not 
change much with further processing. In 
the model, this is obviously a consequence 
of the fact that surface and textbase rela-
tions are very local, while the situation 
model network is more extended. The way 
to test this hypothesis would be to collect 
speed-accuracy trade-off data for inference 
statements differing as outlined above. 
Such data are not available, but the argu-
ments presented here suggest that it would 
be interesting to look at other speed-
accuracy trade-off experiments in which 
differences at the level of the situation 
model are likely to play a role. For exam-
ple, we may compare subjects who have 
developed an adequate situation model (ex-
perts) to less knowledgeable subjects (nov-
ices) with a weak situation model but ap-
propriate surface and textbase strategies. 
We would then predict that inference sen-
tences rise faster to their asymptote for 
novices than for expert subjects. The per-
formance asymptote itself, however, 
should be higher for experts than for nov-
ices. 
One such experiment has recently been 
performed by Schmalhofer, Boschert, and 
Kuhn (1990). Schmalhofer et al. collected 
data from novices and experts verifying 
sentences from a highly technical text (an 
introduction to some features of the pro-
gramming language LISP). They found 
rather striking differences in the speed-
accuracy functions for these two groups of 
subjects, and we shall try to account for 
these differences by means of the hypothe-
ses suggested above. In the Zimny data we 
are dealing with different types of infer-
ences (surface- vs. model-based similarity), 
while Schmalhofer et al. deal with different 
types of subjects (experts with a good situ-
ation model and novices with an incomplete 
or faulty situation model). In both cases, 
the present model predicts quite different 
speed-accuracy trade-off functions for in-
ferences because of the role the situation 
model plays in these decisions. 
Experiment 2 
Schmalhofer et al. (1990) had 39 subjects 
study brief texts introducing them to the 
programming language LISP. Half of the 
subjects had no programming experience, 
while the other half were proficient in the 
programming language Pascal (but had no 
experience with LISP). Therefore, the sub-
jects with programming experience (the ex-
pert group) presumably knew about func-
tions in general, and when studying the 
LISP text, could employ their function 
schemata to understand what they were 
reading (i.e., construct an appropriate situ-
ation model). Novices (the novice group), 
on the other hand, were presumably unable 
to do so within the relatively short time 
they were allowed to study these texts. 
However, they certainly could understand 
the words and phrases they read and form a 
coherent text base. 
Subjects were tested on four texts. An 
example of a text used in the experiment is 
shown in Table 2, together with two types 
of test sentences: an old verbatim sentence 
and a correct inference. Paraphrases of old 
sentences and incorrect distractor items 
were also used in the experiment, but since 
we do not derive theoretical predictions for 
these items, they will be omitted here. Sub-
jects were asked to verify whether or not 
the test sentences were true, and to provide 
confidence judgments.5 When a test sen-
tence was presented, a subject made six re-
5 Schmalhofer (1986) has found the same pattern of 
responses for verification as for sentence recognition. 
T A B L E 2 
A PARAGRAPH FROM T H E T E X T USED IN 
EXPERIMENT 2 A N D SAMPLE T E S T SENTENCES 
Original text 
The function FIRST is used to extract the first 
S-term from a combined S-term. The function 
FIRST has exactly one argument. The 
argument of the function must be a combined 
S-term. The value of the function is the first 
S-term of the argument. 
Test sentences 
Old 
The function FIRST is used to extract the first 
S-term. 
Inference 
A single S-term is produced by the function 
FIRST. 
sponses in a sequence, at 1.5-s intervals 
when signal tones were presented. The first 
response signal occurred 750 ms before the 
sentence appeared on the screen. Obvi-
ously, subjects could only guess at that 
time, but as the other response signals were 
presented they had increasingly more time 
to fully process each test sentence. The last 
response signal differed from the previous 
ones, indicating that there was no time 
pressure for the final response. Each sen-
tence could thus be fully processed. 
Figure 8 shows the probability of Yes re-
sponses to old verbatim sentences for the 
two subject groups as a function of time. 
Subjects start at a value near 50%, but im-
prove rapidly and reach an asymptotic ac-
curacy of 93% and 94%, respectively, in 
about 9.5 s. The curves for expert and nov-
ice subjects are clearly identical. A 2 
(Groups) x 5 (Response Signals) A N O V A 
on arcsine transformed data, omitting the 
first pure guessing point, yielded a highly 
significant main effect for Response Sig-
nals, F(4,144) = 8.83, p < .0001, but no 
group effect nor interaction, both F < 1. 
The data for the inference statements in 
Fig. 9 are quite different. Neither main ef-
fect is significant, F(l,36) = 2.76 for 
Groups and F < 1 for Response Signals, but 
there is a significant interaction, F(4,144) = 
2.72, p < .05. Novices tend to accept infer-
100 
T i m e 
FIG. 8. Judged correctness of old, verbatim test sentences as a function of processing time for 
experts and novices; after Schmalhofer et al. (1990). 
ence statements as true initially, but further 
processing only confuses them. They treat 
inferences much like old sentences at first, 
but then the frequency of their Yes re-
sponses actually decline instead of rising 
continually as in Fig. 8. Experts, on the 
other hand, show a slow but steady in-
crease in Yes responses throughout, ending 
up at a higher level than novice subjects. 
Both groups of subjects take more time on 
the final, unconstrained response for infer-
ences than for old sentences. These find-
ings can be readily interpreted within the 
construction-integration model. 
On-Line Integration 
In previous work with the construction-
integration model, the sentence was as-
sumed to be the processing unit, purely for 
reasons of convenience: as long as one is 
not much concerned with what happens 
within a sentence, this is a useful simplifi-
cation. However, if one is interested in how 
activation develops during the reading of a 
test sentence, the fiction of the sentence as 
a processing unit must be abandoned. In-
stead, it will be assumed here that words 
are the processing units. As each word is 
read, all elements that can be constructed 
at this point are constructed and added to 
the existing net, which is then re-inte-
grated. Thus, each sentence contains as 
many processing units as it has words (or, 
rather, word groups, the L-units in Fig. 3). 
In order to illustrate how this model 
works, we first simulate the construction of 
the original text representation. Since we 
are not interested in the on-line properties 
of this process, this is done in exactly the 
same way as with the Zimny data: all the 
appropriate L , S, P, and M units are con-
structed and connected according to the 
same principles as in Figs. 3 and 4. A func-
tion schema, with slots for "Name ," 
"Use," "Input," and "Output," provides 
T i m e 
FIG. 9. Judged correctness of inferences as a function of processing time for experts and novices; 
after Schmalhofer et al. (1990). 
the basis for the situation model. The re-
sulting network is then integrated, and a 
pattern of activation is obtained which, to-
gether with the net of interrelationships it-
self, characterizes the memory representa-
tion formed for the to-be-remembered text. 
An old, verbatim test sentence is recog-
nized by computing the amount of activa-
tion of its elements at each input stage. 
Thus, the test sentence "The function 
FIRST is used to extract the first S-term," 
is processed in seven input stages, as 
shown in Fig. 10. First, "The function" is 
processed, yielding the elements L2, P2, 
and M2. The second input unit comprises 
"FIRST" that is the elements L3, SI, P3, 
and M3. The remaining input units and con-
structed linguistic, propositional and situa-
tional memory representations are also 
shown in Fig. 10. 
Figure 11 illustrates how the model 
works for the inference statement "A single 
T h e - f u n c t i o n 
L2 
P 2 - P3 P5 P6 - P 7 - P8 P9 
M2 M3 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9 
F I G . 10. An old, verbatim test sentence, processed sequentially in seven input stages. 
S-term is produced by the function 
FIRST." Only one element is constructed 
in the first processing unit: the unit L20 "a-
single" (the numbering takes account of 
what was already constructed in the pro-
cessing of the original text). More happens 
next: "S-term" corresponds to L12, P9, 
and M9 of the original text. Furthermore, at 
this point the new S-element S18 is con-
structed, as well as the proposition P21, 
(SINGLE, S-TERM). Note that no new 
model element is constructed correspond-
ing to P21, for there is no way to know 
where in the function-schema such an ele-
ment should be placed. In the third input 
unit, not only the new surface element L21 
is generated, but also the sentence unit S22 
and the corresponding proposition P22 
( P R O D U C E , $, ( S I N G L E , S - T E R M ) ) . 
Both of these are at this point incomplete: 
we don't know as yet what produces (SIN-
G L E , S-TERM)—the $-sign is used as a 
placeholder in the proposition—and we do 
not know all of the constituents of S20. S-
and P-units are constructed as soon as pos-
sible, before all of the relevant information 
is available. This assumption in the present 
model is supported by results in the psy-
cholinguists literature, where it has been 
shown repeatedly that people assign words 
and phrases to plausible syntactic struc-
tures on-line, and do not wait until a com-
plete analysis becomes possible (e.g., Fra-
zier & Rayner, 1982). 
The immediate processing strategy at the 
linguistic and textbase levels contrasts with 
a wait-and-see strategy at the situation 
model level. In the former case, there are 
powerful heuristics available that make im-
mediate processing feasible [e.g., the Min-
imal Attachment strategy of Frazier & 
Rayner (1982), or the Referential Coher-
ence strategy for forming a coherent text-
base (Kintsch & van Dijk, 1978)]. The re-
sults may not be optimal (e.g., causal links 
are more useful in stories than mere refer-
ential links), or they may have to be revised 
eventually (as in garden-path sentences), 
but they yield useful approximations for on-
line processing that can later be modified if 
necessary. Immediate processing is also 
used when situation model elements are en-
countered in a test sentence that are al-
ready available in the original memory rep-
resentation of the text. In that case, it is 
assumed that they retain their original po-
sition in the situation model. (As all heuris-
tics, this will sometimes be wrong, e.g. in 
the case of false test sentences.) Newly 
formed elements of the situation model, on 
the other hand, cannot be assigned on-line 
to a slot in the schema: where an element 
fits into a schema, or whether it doesn't fit 
at all or contradicts it, usually can be deter-
mined only after the whole sentence has 
been processed. Thus, the processing of 
new situation model elements is delayed 
until the sentence wrap-up. In Fig. 11, the 
elements M21 and M22, (PRODUCE, M2, 
(SINGLE,M9)), are therefore constructed 
in Input Stage 6 and assigned to the 
"Output" slot of the Function schema. 
i n 
A - s i n g l e S - t e r m 
L 2 0 L 9 
S 1 8 
P21 P 9 
III IV V VI 
i s - p r o d u c e d by t h e - f u n c t i o n FIRST. 
L2 I L 2 2 L2 L3 
S 19 
S 2 2 
* P 2 2 ' P 2 " P 3 
FIG. 11. A correct inference, processed in six input stages. 
Fit of the Model to the Data 
How well can this model account for the 
Schmalhofer et al. (1990) data? There are 
two striking features of these data: the fact 
that for old verbatim test sentences, the 
speed-accuracy trade-off functions increase 
steadily throughout the processing period 
and are essentially the same for novice and 
expert subjects; and the fact that experts 
have slowly rising, high-asymptote func-
tions for correct inferences, while novices 
are characterized by fast-rising, low-
asymptote functions. Statistically, we have 
observed an interaction between process-
ing time and the two subject groups for in-
ferences, but not for old sentences. The 
model implies both of these observations. 
At this point, there are two ways to pro-
ceed. We could try to explore appropriate 
link values for the coherence matrix, esti-
mate thresholds, and so on, as was done for 
the Zimny data, and attempt to fit the 
speed-accuracy data quantitatively. On the 
other hand, if we are satisfied with a qual-
itative fit only, computations could be 
based on the same parameters that were 
used in the Zimny data. This approach has 
some advantages in that it avoids the pos-
sibility that good fits are obtained merely 
because we happened to select just the right 
parameter combinations. There are no rea-
sons at all why the same parameters should 
fit both sets of data, and good reasons why 
they should not (different subject groups, 
vastly different texts, different task de-
mands—for superficial processing of many 
simple texts in one case and careful pro-
cessing of much less material in the other). 
Nevertheless, if the model really has some-
thing to say about sentence recognition in-
dependent of the numerical values of the 
parameters in the Zimny simulation, one 
might expect that the qualitative pattern of 
the predictions would correspond to the 
main features of the new set of data. We 
have therefore chosen the second way to 
proceed. Our goal, then, cannot be to re-
produce the actual pattern of the results 
presented in Figs. 8 and 9, but merely their 
essential feature: the absence of an interac-
tion between processing time and back-
ground knowledge for old sentences, and a 
particular type of interaction—a more rapid 
initial rise in activation for low-knowledge 
subjects than for high-knowledge sub-
jects—for inferences. 
The difference between novice and ex-
pert subjects in the present model is that the 
former have only a fragmentary, partly cor-
rect situation model. Since we are only in-
terested in qualitative predictions, the more 
radical assumption was made that novices 
have no situation model at all. Specifically, 
the speed-accuracy functions were simu-
lated with the same parameter values that 
were used for the Immediate Group above, 
except that all link strengths were set to 0 in 
the situation model of the novices. The re-
sults are shown in Figs. 12 and 13 for old 
sentences and inferences. These calcula-
tions are based on the old sentence ana-
lyzed in Fig. 10 and the inference analyzed 
in Fig. 11. 
Schmalhofer's speed-accuracy functions 
(Figs. 8 and 9) plot the probability of a Yes 
response against time. The model predic-
tions are in terms of total activation against 
input stage.6 Nevertheless, Fig. 12 manages 
to capture the relevant features of Fig. 8. 
Old, verbatim test items increase rapidly in 
strength and to a high level, the same for 
experts and novices. Inferences, on the 
other hand, rise faster for novices, but to a 
lower level, while the inference function for 
the experts rises more slowly initially but to 
a higher level (Fig. 13). Whereas for expert 
subjects the inferences were model-based, 
they were surface- and text-based for nov-
ices. This pattern of results is thus in close 
agreement with the Zimny data. 
As in Experiment 1, the question arises 
how general the results shown in Figs. 12 
and 13 are, since once again, we are com-
paring average data with predictions for 
single sentences. Typical as well as atypical 
6 Very similar predictions are obtained if the length 
of each input unit is made proportional to the number 
of cycles needed for the integration process to settle. 
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FIG. 12. Activation of an old test sentence as a function of processing time for experts and novices. 
examples can be selected, just as in Exper-
iment 1. For instance, the old sentence 
"The argument of the function must be a 
combined S-term" yields results much like 
the old sentence used in Fig. 12: steady in-
creases for both groups throughout the 
whole time period, with most of the in-
crease in the first half, though now the ex-
pert group has more activation than the 
novice group at all points. Similarly, the in-
ference statement "Combined S-terms 
used as arguments of a function are legal" 
corresponds nicely to the results shown in 
Fig. 13: there is the slower initial increase in 
activation for the expert subjects (18% of 
their total in the first half, vs. 50% for the 
novice subjects), and the final cross-over 
on the last point. On the other hand, it is not 
hard to find atypical examples. Consider 
the inference "The argument of the func-
tion may consist of five Lisptoms". For 
the first three cycles, this inference is iden-
tical with the old sentence just discussed. 
Hence we have an initial increase in activa-
tion for both the expert and novice subject 
groups. However, from the fourth cycle on, 
this inference behaves much like the other 
two examples that have been discussed 
here. In the first three cycles when the sen-
tence can be differentiated from an old sen-
tence, only 5% of the remaining activation 
accrues for expert subjects, vs. 57% for 
novice subjects. Thus, although the details 
of this example are much more complicated 
than for the other inference sentences dis-
cussed here, it shares some of the same 
qualitative features that characterize the 
recognition of inferences in the model. 
Obviously, Figs. 11 and 12 are only car-
icatures of the corresponding data in Figs. 8 
and 9: our goal was merely to show that the 
model can predict the interaction for the 
inference sentences, and the absence of 
such an interaction for the old sentences 
without any further parameter estimation. 
The inherent features of the model, not any 
particular lucky parameter estimates, are 
responsible for this prediction. To actually 
fit the model to the data, however, we 




FIG. 13. Activation of a correct inference as a function of processing time for experts and novices. 
to transform activation strengths into re-
sponse probabilities, just as was done in 
Experiment 1. 
CONCLUSION 
A model of sentence memory from dis-
course has been developed and tested here 
which builds upon previous work on item 
recognition and discourse comprehension. 
The recognition mechanism used in this 
model has been derived from previous 
models of recognition developed to account 
for list learning data. Two elaborations 
from the domain of discourse comprehen-
sion were needed to enable this mechanism 
to deal with sentences from a coherent dis-
course, rather than with list items. First, 
sentences must be represented in memory 
at several levels of representation, each of 
which can contribute to a recognition or 
verification judgment. Second, the very 
processes of comprehension as formulated 
in the construction-integration model of 
Kintsch (1988) were shown also to be in-
volved in judging whether a sentence had 
been experienced before as part of a dis-
course. Thus, familiar theoretical notions 
could be combined to provide an explana-
tion for sentence recognition. 
This explanation fared quite well when 
tested against the results of empirical inves-
tigations of sentence judgment. In Experi-
ment 1, a good quantitative account of rec-
ognition for old sentences, paraphrases, 
and inferences was obtained for delays 
ranging from immediate tests to four days. 
However, due to the complexity of the 
comprehension model, a large number of 
parameters had to be estimated to match 
these data. Hence, we changed our strategy 
in Experiment 2 from one of fitting empiri-
cal results quantitatively to one of testing 
qualitative implications of the model which 
did not involved further parameter estima-
tion. The data in question concerned the 
time course of sentence verification. It was 
shown that the model predicted major qual-
itative features of speed-accuracy trade-off 
functions, without estimating new parame-
ters. Thus, the model has been tested suc-
cessfully against two large, complex sets of 
sentence memory data. 
The model of sentence memory devel-
oped here is quite general and can be ap-
plied to many different texts and test sen-
tences, with one serious restriction: in or-
der to apply the model, one needs to know 
what the situation model would look like 
for the text and the subjects in question. 
Linguistic analyses as well as propositional 
textbases (the latter if necessary based on 
the default rule of argument overlap, as in 
the present case) can be constructed for 
any kind of text, but situation models are 
much less well understood. In particular, it 
is not clear how nonpropositional situation 
models (e.g., mental maps, as in Perrig & 
Kintsch, 1985) could be integrated into the 
present framework. 
Earlier models of sentence recognition 
share some characteristics with the model 
proposed here, but differ in other respects. 
Two such model are the schema-pointer-
plus-tag model of Graesser (1981) and the 
plausibility judgment model of Reder 
(1982). Both models, in common with an 
earlier generation of recognition models, 
conceptualize recognition as a match be-
tween the memory representation of an 
item and the item presented at test, thus 
violating a basic feature of current recogni-
tion models as discussed here. Further-
more, they are much less specific than the 
computational model presented here. In 
other respects, however, there are some 
communalities between these models and 
the present approach. Graesser distin-
guishes two stages of sentence recognition, 
one corresponding to the question "Is the 
item in the memory trace?," and the other 
to "Must the item have been in the 
passage?" (Graesser, 1981, p. 92). Reder 
similarly distinguishes between a plausibil-
ity judgment and a direct retrieval (Reder, 
1982). Clearly, there are some parallels 
here between matches based on the surface 
and textbase representation on the one 
hand and matches based on the situation 
model on the other. One could, in fact, 
claim that what has been done here is to 
provide an explanation and computational 
mechanism for the phrase "plausibility 
judgment." Significant differences should 
not be overlooked, however. Reder, for in-
stance, emphasizes the stage character of 
the process with plausibility judgments nor-
mally coming first, preempting direct 
matches. In the present model, matches at 
all three levels of the representation occur 
as soon as possible and in parallel, with the 
contribution of the situational match neces-
sarily coming in rather late in the process-
ing of a sentence, as the analyses of the 
speed-accuracy trade-off data in Experi-
ment 2 show quite clearly. A recent report 
by Ratcliff and McKoon (1989) further sup-
ports these conclusions. They have shown 
in a sentence matching experiment that dif-
ferent kinds of information are available at 
different points during retrieval, with sur-
face similarity playing the strongest role 
early in the time course of retrieval, in 
agreement with our conclusions. 
One does not need a separate model for 
sentence recognition. If we put together 
what we know about the item-recognition 
process per se with the construction-
integration model of discourse comprehen-
sion, we have a ready-made explanation for 
many of the phenomena of sentence recog-
nition. Thus, the construction-integration 
model comes one step closer toward be-
coming a general theory of discourse com-
prehension and memory. 
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